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Aseema Sinha
Abstract
Scholars of business associations have recently learned a great deal about how associ-
ations contribute to development, but much less about the origins of such developmental
associations. This essay introduces and assesses a new political explanation for the origins
of ‘developmental associations.’ Conventional wisdom holds that developmental associa-
tions must be able to rise above political and collusive pressures and establish autonomy
from states. Yet, I argue that these associations’ developmental capacities emerge as a re-
sult of active state support by key actors, and in response to challenges and threats posed
by competitive business organizations. Developmental associations emerge and acquire
their capacities as they confront internal threats from other associations, as well as uti-
lize the opportunities presented by the national state and international channels. In this
view, functional or organizational capacity is not enough, rather, developmental business
associations, must exhibit political capacity—that is the ability to manage the political
environment, and respond to the structure of opportunities and threats. This explanation
views developmental business associations as political organizations seeking power as well
as offers a historically sensitive analysis of transformation of business politics in reforming
India.
KEYWORDS: Development, Collective Action, Business Associations, Globalization,
Developmental Associations, India
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In India, in 1992, an engineering association called Confederation of 
Engineering Industry transformed itself into an all-industry association and 
changed its name to Confederation of Indian Industry (CII).1 At that time, 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and 
Association of Chambers of Commerce (Assocham), two national associations, 
dominated India’s business scene. While many regional and sectoral business 
associations represented the diversity of business in India, a delayed international 
opening and democratic continuity had cemented a well-connected, protectionist 
elite—FICCI. FICCI was especially powerful with strong connections to the 
ruling Congress Party and the bureaucratic apparatus (Kochanek 1974; 1985; 
1986; 1987; 1996). Nevertheless, another association rose to challenge its 
dominance in the early 1990s.  Within a decade, CII rose to become a nationally 
recognized association representing diverse sectors of Indian industry. In 
response, FICCI, until then the dominant business association, revived itself and 
became increasingly developmental in nature.2 Thus, currently, India has two 
dominant developmentally oriented associations—CII, and FICCI—which 
compete with each other but also pursue many developmental activities at both 
the central and provincial levels.3
How may we understand such a quick and successful transition from a 
sectorally based, somewhat, narrow concerns of an engineering association into a 
nationally recognized apex association? This transformation poses a puzzle to 
theories of business development in countries like India. In a situation of ‘statist 
pluralism’ as in India (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 255), where numerous groups 
vie for the state’s attention, the emergence of a developmentally oriented business 
association is unexpected.4 Olson (1965), Bardhan (1984 [1998]) and Rudolph 
1CII’s historical antecedents lie in the engineering industry. In 1974, the Association of Indian 
Engineering Industry (AIEI) was formed as a result of a merger of two engineering associations. 
In 1986 AIEI was re-christened as Confederation of Engineering Industry (CEI) as it began to 
invite other associations to be members. In 1992, it expanded its scope to become an all-industry 
association, and renamed itself as Confederation of Indian Industry (CII).  
2Following Doner and Schneider (2000, 263), I define developmental associations as associations 
that improve the functioning of markets and states. For example, a developmental association may 
work toward the provision of better infrastructure by the state, or help firms to improve their 
quality performance, or help them to secure export markets through trade fairs, market surveys etc.  
3Assocham, a smaller organization, is less powerful and visible but also performs many 
developmental activities.  
4The literature on business and labor and state relations has been organized around the idea of 
democratic or societal corporatism (in contrast to liberal pluralist capitalism) associated with 
northern European countries. Scholars writing on developing countries introduced some 
innovations in the concept by invoking the concept of state corporatism where the state itself 
organized corporate interests, found in many Latin countries (e.g. Mexico and Brazil). Yet, the 
concept of state corporatism failed to adequately capture non-corporatist countries like India 
where state domination co-existed with multiplicity and plurality of societal interests. This led 
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and Rudolph’s arguments (1987) would suggest that rent seeking distributional 
coalitions would be the norm in an established democracy like India.5 Second, this 
transformation in business collective action in the early 1990s coincided with a 
comprehensive liberalization program wherein the role for collective action 
seemed accentuated. What governance role could a business association perform 
in the face of the apparent withdrawal of the state from regulatory activity? 
Liberalization seemed to reduce the role for political lobbying; yet, an 
organization that developed new tools of political access and influence rose to 
prominence. Furthermore, the transformation of an engineering association into 
an all industry association posed immense collective action dilemmas and 
obstacles for the association—FICCI, the competitor organization, enjoyed access 
to the then formal mechanisms of power, the membership base of CEI was not 
supportive of such a move, and a consultant had recommended against such a 
transformation. Moreover, competition between associations could weaken both 
associations. Yet in India, an engineering association transformed itself into an 
all- industry confederation and its competitor acquired many developmental 
features.6 While competition between associations in India has led to 
fragmentation of business representation, it has also stimulated many 
developmental activities by the associations. 
This sudden transformation in business politics in India also raises a larger 
theoretical puzzle about business collective action. When and how does business 
collective action emerge and succeed in developing country contexts? We know 
that common interests may not mobilize easily in defense of those interests (Olson 
1965; Hardin 1982; Oliver 1993), yet systematic empirical and theoretical 
attention to the political context and institutional mechanisms that enable or 
hinder the formation and consolidation of common or collective interests remains 
scanty. We need better answers to the question: How does business–an integral 
segment of society—emerge to solve its collective action dilemma in dirigiste 
contexts and adjust in a rapidly changing and internationally complex world? One
reason for this lacunae in the literature is that despite its power, business often 
finds it difficult to mobilize collectively to achieve broader developmental goals, 
especially in developing and large country contexts.7 In most developing 
Rudolph and Rudolph (1987, 252-258) to propose a new concept: involuted pluralism or state 
dominated pluralism to refer to India.  
5Also see Kochanek (1974); Herring (1999).  
6The dependant variable of interest in this article is the transformation of a sectoral association 
into a multi-sectoral association and subsequent resurgence of a traditional association with many 
developmental features. 
7See Smith (2000) for the argument that business in the US comes together only rarely. Also see, 
Hart (2004) and Vogel (1989). Offe and Wiesenthal (1985), in contrast, suggest that business 
collective action is easier than labor mobilization. For a comparative approach to the study of 
business-state relations see Wilson (2003).  For studies of business-state interaction in other 
dirigiste contexts see, Payne (1994); Maxfield and Schneider (1997); Schneider (1998); and 
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countries, states are more powerful and capital scarce and dependent upon 
government initiatives. State dirigisme and weak business development creates 
the conditions for rent-seeking relations between state actors and business groups, 
precluding positive and developmental relations between the two.8 Business 
associations, among the various ‘weapons’ of political mobilization wielded by 
business, promise an answer to the collective action dilemma posed above.9 In 
line with this realization, analytical and empirical attention has recently focused 
on the relationship between business associations and economic performance.
Some argue that business associations are intrinsically rent seeking and 
distributive.10 Others assess the impact of voluntary associations on economic 
performance, macroeconomic stabilization, and democratic consolidation in a 
more balanced manner.11 Recent reinterpretation of the East Asian miracle has 
sought to re-evaluate the role played by business associations and collective 
business groups.12 This body of work led scholars to challenge and go beyond the 
erstwhile “negative presumptions against ‘special interests’ in Mancur Olson’s 
theories of collective action and their extensions in the NIE” (Doner and 
Schneider 2000, 262; Maxfield and Schneider 1997) to highlight the “positive” 
contributions of business associations. Such approaches highlight how business 
associations may respond to the functional needs of a system in crisis, and may 
perform “market-supporting or market-complementing activities” responding to 
crucial market and state failures pervasive in many developing and transitional 
economies. 
Yet, these approaches are mostly concerned with the impact of business 
associations on economic development and leave unaddressed a prior question: 
Where do developmental associations come from? That is, what are the political 
(as opposed to efficiency-based) dynamics of the genesis and reproduction of 
developmental business associations? Neo-institutionalist approaches to the study 
of collective action, more generally, link material interests to action to effects, but 
are unable to grasp how new patterns of collective action arise or are 
Kingstone (1999).  
8Krueger (1974); Herring (1999); Evans (1995); and Kochanek (1974). South Korea and Japan are 
exceptions to this general pattern: In South Korea, for example, business and state came together 
to craft a developmental state [Fields (1997); Kang (2002); Noble (1998); and Chibber (2003)]. 
The contrast of South Korea with India is especially instructive.  Chibber (2003) compares early 
business development in India and South Korea and argues that in early independent India (1940s 
and 1950s), the business class launched an offensive against developmental goals of the new 
Indian state, thus aborting a mutually beneficial relationship; this contributed to a failed 
developmental state in India.    
9I define business associations as voluntary membership-driven organizations of business people, 
firms, or other associations. 
10Olson (1965).  
11Swensen (2002); Schmitter (1994); Perez-Aleman (2003); and Goldsmith (2002).  
12Kim (1993); Kang (2002); and Evans (1995).  
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transformed. An answer to this question would lead us to a more careful analysis 
of the political context of business development across diverse contexts. In a 
recent assessment, Ben Ross Schneider undertakes such a comparative analysis 
arguing that varying patterns of business organization may be traced to the actions 
of state officials (2004).13 This emphasis on the role of the state is a crucial 
corrective to the existing focus on functional attributes of associations. Building 
on his insight, I pay attention to openings in the “political opportunity structure,” 
which allows us to better understand the role of state actors and other micro-
political institutions in encouraging or disorganizing business.14 These insights 
allow a more political analysis of how business strategies (developmental or 
otherwise) are themselves molded by the features of the political-institutional 
environment. 
This paper examines change and transformation in the nature of interest 
group mobilization and state-business interaction in reforming India.15 This 
examination of a dynamic process allows me to put forward an alternative 
framework to the study of interest groups and business associations, one that is 
more attentive to the political origins of business power and to contextual 
institutional variables rather than mere organizational dynamics. In strong 
confirmation of the arguments presented by Schneider (2004), I find that state 
actors and intra-state dynamics play an unexpectedly large role in shaping 
business development in India even under conditions of neoliberal reform. A 
further explication of the conditions under which state actors facilitate business 
collective action (when and how) urges me to incorporate a key concept from the 
social movement literature—the political opportunity structure. I argue that it is 
openings within the state, intra-state conflicts, and weakness of existing business 
organizations that may lead certain state actors to encourage other business 
groups. Thus, I argue that the rise and reproduction of developmental associations 
is shaped by state actors and strengthens the political settlement that underlies 
their continued activism in politics. Most crucially, certain critical features of the 
political and business context, most notably competition with rival associations 
and the federal structure, shape the transformation of business associations and 
their specific organizational form.16
13Also see Doner and Schneider (2000) section on “external enforcement and economic 
performance” (pages 275-278) where they analyze briefly how discipline by states may make 
some associations more efficient. 
14This concept is drawn from the social movement literature. For an introduction to the concept, 
see Tarrow (1998). 
15In India, an economic reform program was launched in 1985 followed by comprehensive 
external and domestic liberalization in 1991.  
16The concept of the political opportunity structure is more general and allows us to compare, for 
example, the limited role of the state in shaping business development countries like England 
versus their more activist role in Germany. It also could shed light on the disorganization of both 
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This emphasis on the political and institutional context must not neglect to 
analyze the responses and strategies of the business associations themselves, 
which are purposive entities, seeking power for their organizations. Therefore, I 
argue that developmental business associations must have political capacity, i.e. 
the capacity to strategically respond to the specific external characteristics of the 
political system in addition to organizational and functional capacity.17 If this is 
so, then the pre-existing and historical institutional framework will profoundly 
shape the nature of business power and business activism, thereby challenging the 
functionalist expectation that globalization pressures are sufficient to transform 
fragmented business organizations into encompassing ones. In contrast, the 
incentives, actions, and behaviors of state actors mediate and refract functionalist 
imperatives. 
In contrast to the approach adopted here, pluralist and neo-institutional 
perspectives are non-political and functional: Pluralist theories see the process of 
business transformation in non-partisan ways, while neo-institutional accounts see 
associations responding to market failures and state failures in adequate ways.18
My analysis goes against both pluralist and functionalist accounts of business 
associations by articulating a more realistic analysis of the political origins of 
associational transformation.  In both the neo-institutionalists and pluralists 
arguments, business associations are mechanisms through which others—business 
actors— act; they are not purposive entities or political actors themselves. In 
contrast, the evidence presented in this paper shows that it is important to bring 
politics back into an analysis of business associations and unite historical and 
institutional approaches to the study of collective action by ‘strong’ actors.19  Such 
an approach would look at how collective action of business is transformed over 
time but without ignoring the role of institutions and political contextual variables 
in shaping that transformation. These questions have profound consequences for 
our understanding of business collective organization across other systems. While 
comparative political economy debates have identified different models of state-
interest group interaction (see Table 1 below) under situations where states are 
autonomous and when they are weak, these cross-sectional models do not 
generate unequivocal conclusions about the origins or transformations of these 
patterns of interest group development from one model to another. 
labor and business in the US. For an analysis of the larger political context of business 
development in the US, see Gordon (1998); Lehne (2001); and Martin (2000).  
17I elaborate the strategic responses by business associations in another article, “Business 
Strategies in Globalizing India: Reproduction and Transformation of Interest Representation in 
India.” 
18A classic statement of the pluralist argument is Truman (1971). 
19Following Thelen’s call to unite institutional and historical approaches in comparative political 
economy (Thelen 2002). 
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Table 1: Comparative Models of State-Business Relations20
State
Business

   Autonomous       Weak
Coherent/Encompassing Corporatism 
Or Embedded Autonomy 
Germany
South Korea
Mexico
Chile
Liberal Pluralism
United Kingdom
Dispersed/Fragmented State Pluralism Or Embedded 
Particularism, Or
Over-Developed State 
India, Brazil
Pluralist State and Disorganized
Business
United States
India21
I organize the paper in four parts. First, I lay out the empirical puzzle of 
transformation and emergence of a business association in India. In section two, I 
examine how openings in the political opportunity structure, represented by prime 
minister Rajiv Gandhi’s initiatives, facilitated the rise of CII. Further, the nature 
of state power—the power of the civil service and informal patterns of state-
business interactions—shape business strategies in subtle ways. I go on to analyze 
the impact of federalism. The last section analyses how competition in the 
business sub-system shapes the emergent associations as well as contributes to the 
absence of associational consolidation in India. The conclusion ties the main 
argument together. 
An Alternative Framework For the Rise of a Developmentally–Oriented 
Association in India22
In January 1992, the then engineering association, Confederation of 
Engineering industry (hereafter CEI) transformed itself into Confederation of 
20The concepts in this table are drawn from a rich comparative political economy literature; some 
of its salient authors are: Schmitter and Lehmbruch (1979); Lehmbruch and Schmitter (1982); 
Amsden (1989); Johnson (1982); Evans (1995); Rudolph and Rudolph (1987); Herring (1999); 
Krueger (1974); and Alavi (1982). 
21India has mostly been perceived to have a strong autonomous state but its divided structure also 
lends it to be in the right hand box.  
22This analysis relies on primary fieldwork conducted in India, a newspaper database constructed 
by the author from six to eight Indian newspapers for the period 1990-2004, primary published 
and unpublished documents of the various business associations, and repeated interviews with 
members of the various business associations. 
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Indian Industry (hereafter CII) seeking to represent the entire industrial sector. 
This transformation was not without its naysayers. In fact, its largely engineering 
membership base was not supportive of such a move and a consultant hired to 
evaluate whether the association should go this route had recommended against 
such a transformation.23 At the time, national economic policy was in transition 
and it was not very clear what the new role and tasks of such an organization 
would be. Initially, the transformation was more in change of name than in fact: 
In 1992 the association had only 100 non-engineering members out of a total 
membership of 2600, less than 4 percent, and the organization found it difficult to 
go beyond its engineering base.24
Despite these uncertain beginnings, the association over time came to 
acquire a prominence, and was recognized to be a key partner for many of the 
government’s policy initiatives. In March 2004, 12 years after its transmutation, 
Tarun Das, the Director-General of CII was asked: “What has been your most 
momentous achievement?” He replied: “I think, the really big occasion for us was 
to transit from an engineering association to being CII. That opened the window 
very wide and created so many new opportunities.”25 CII expanded and diversified 
its membership base over time. In 1987, CEI’s membership was 2005 companies, 
which grew to 2,567 in 1991 and to 4,700 in 2003.26 In 1991, it had few 
multinational members. By 2003, attracted by its political influence, 305 
multinational companies had joined the organization.27 By 2003, engineering 
industries were about 50.3 percent (around 2,365 firms) of its total members 
(4,700 members), a sharp decrease from 1992.28 It is also worth noting that a large 
majority of CII’s membership base—95.3 percent—has joint venture 
collaborations, mostly with foreign firms.29
A growth in membership corresponded with an expansion in the scope of 
its activities. By 2004, it seemed to have a finger in every pie from “social sector 
23Interview with CII official, August 9, 2003. This was confirmed in newspaper reports of the 
time. Interestingly, in 1991, given opposition from its members to such a move, the President of 
CEI was forced to clarify that, “The Confederation will continue to widen its base without 
shedding its industry-specific identity. He also ruled out a change in the name of his organization 
to Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) as suggested by some.”  “CEI to Pressure Opposition to 
accept Reforms Package,” Business Standard, 1 July 1991. By December 1991, CEI had changed 
its name to CII.  
24CII, Annual Report, 1993. Interview with senior officials of the CII who had been with the 
organization since the mid 1980s. 
25“Interview with Tarun Das by Shubhrangshu Roy,” March 26, 2004 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/582280.cms (Accessed on March 28, 2004).  
26Annual Report, 1991; Annual Report, 2003.  
27The total list of multinational company members of CII is with the author.  
28Author’s calculations from CII, Membership Directory, 2003. 
29Calculated from CII, Membership Directory, 2003.  Pedersen noted a similar finding for the year 
1992 (Pedersen 2000).  
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development,” to “security dialogue, 30 to election participation awareness 
campaign,31 to a meditation cell.”32 It was active internationally and bilaterally, 
responding to a wide array of security and economic crises faced by India.33 It was 
especially active in the United States and began to engage the US domestic 
political process quite intensively.34 The association along with FICCI was invited 
to all the key national level advisory bodies and became part of the official 
government’s delegation to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999 at 
Seattle.35 CII, together with FICCI, came to represent the most prominent sections 
of Indian business, relegating Assocham to third rank. It seemed as if business in 
India had ‘solved’ its collective action problem and become a joint partner of the 
Indian state.
Within the context of a neo-instititionalist framework, CII represents a 
classic example of a “developmental association” responding to crucial market 
and state failure challenges.36 It supports the ongoing economic reform process 
pressuring the government to provide infrastructure (e.g. power sector reform) 
and a non-corrupt administration. It self-consciously abjures distributive and 
particularistic needs of its individual members, claiming that no narrow and 
individual specific demands of members are defended in front of the 
government.37 It initiated a quality movement among its member companies and 
provided crucial marketing information and other information to its member 
companies. 
30CII, Annual Report (2003, 16).  
31As part of its “corporate social responsibility program” CII requested cellular operators to send a 
SMS message to around 35 million voters reminding them to exercise their franchise on polling 
day in India (April-May 2004).  “CII To pitch in with SMS to Alert Voters,” The Financial 
Express, 22 April 2004.  
32The CII, Annual report noted in a section titled, “New Frontiers,” that the CII—Southern Region 
had signed a memorandum of understanding with the ‘Indian Centre of Meditation and Dispute 
Resolution’ for creating “awareness about the potential of meditation as a preferable means of 
dispute resolution and to get industry personnel trained in matters of meditation.” See CII, Annual 
Report (2002, 24).  
33For example, it played a major role in diluting opposition to India’s nuclear tests (of 1998) in the 
US Congress.
34Tarun Das, chief mentor of the Confederation of Indian Industry, Kiran Pasricha, CII’s senior 
director for North America attended the Democratic Party Convention in Boston, out of only 4 
people working on India to do so. See K.P. Nayar, “India Should Use Political Events in the US to 
its Advantage,” The Telegraph, 11 August 2003.   
35As part of the government’s delegation, two members of CII were allowed to be part of the 
Ministerial deliberations in an advisory capacity. 
36Vanita Shastri argues that CII is a developmental organization (1997). Also see Nayar (1998; 
2001),  Pedersen (2000); and Kochanek (1995-1996).  
37Officials at different levels of the organization stressed this. Government officials also admit that 
CII demands usually relate not to one or two members but to an entire sector or industry. This 
does not mean that no member makes such requests but the secretariat seems to have resisted such 
internal pressures for the pursuit of narrow particularistic benefits. 
8 Business and Politics Vol. 7 [2005], No. 2, Article 2
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol7/iss2/art2
How did a narrow organization concerned only with its own specific 
sector transform itself and become developmental? Interpretations that focus on 
organizational attributes of the organization or functional needs arising out of 
globalization are unable to explain the politically contested process through which 
CII came into being and rose to prominence. The functional explanation may 
explain why the organization became useful to policymakers; it does not, 
however, address the question of why and how such an organization came into 
being. It is clear that we need an independent theory of business development in 
dirigiste yet pluralist systems; such a theory must be able to account for change 
over time, and offer a set of assumptions about incentives and interests of state 
and business actors. Thus, what contextual conditions stimulate developmental 
versus predatory associational activity needs to be theorized more systematically.
Distribution of Power, the Indian State, and Business Associations in India
Counter-intuitively for our expectation of India where distributional 
coalitions are considered to be strong, but in line with Schneider’s (2004) recent 
arguments, state actors facilitated the rise of CII as a competitor organization to 
FICCI. Moreover, and even more interestingly, state structure (federalism) and 
the pattern of state power shaped the activities and strategies of emerging and 
reforming business associations alike. Over time, state actors, by sponsoring 
different organizations at different points in time, enhanced the competitive 
fragmentation within the business sector of the Indian economy. The Indian state 
played a crucial role in transforming CEI from its engineering focus to an all-
industry focus and in giving it importance.  In the mid 1980s, the state leadership 
deployed the CEI to further its reform program. Further, the Indian prime minister 
gave access, symbolic importance, and explicit tasks to CEI at a crucial moment 
in its development.  
In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi was elected as India’s new prime minister with a 
massive mandate and introduced a reformist agenda. He initiated significant 
economic liberalization despite serious opposition from his own party members 
and a history of dirigiste economic policies in India.38 His reform program aimed 
at technological modernization, external opening as well as a reduction of state 
regulation. The most important of these included a relaxation of the restrictive 
licensing arrangements, a new fiscal policy aimed at promoting investment and 
research, and liberalization of foreign exchange rules to promote the inflow of 
finance and technology transfer from abroad. While limited, his reform program 
represented one of the first serious attempts to reorient India’s economic strategy 
toward more openness and competition. In this quest, he renewed links with the 
newly emerging business association, the Association of Indian Engineering 
Industry (AIEI), CII's predecessor. FICCI, in contrast, was protectionist, weak, 
38See Kohli (1989) and Harriss (1987) for an analysis of the 1985 reform program.  
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and fractionalized and had acquired vested interests in the continuation of the 
regulatory system rather than its withdrawal.39 Rajiv Gandhi needed an 
organization that was outside of the pre-existing business-state networks, not 
troubled by factional politics, and could support his reform program. AIEI, till 
then, was based in Calcutta and was a relative outsider to the business-politics 
nexus centered in New Delhi. Most importantly, AIEI’s international activities 
resonated with Rajiv Gandhi’s reform program, which stressed technological 
integration with the West; in contrast, FICCI was relatively more inward looking 
in its orientation. AIEI had initiated global linkages with international 
organizations, other business firms, and groups in the mid 1970s.40 AIEI and 
CEI’s organizational culture and outward orientation resonated with Rajiv 
Gandhi’s clean image and reformist agenda. 
Most importantly, Rajiv Gandhi needed AIEI when he faced significant 
opposition from within his party and the bureaucracy for his reform program. 
Most of his close advisors were perceived to be technocratic and out of touch with 
the masses. Lacking any supporters within a conservative bureaucracy, and facing 
a resistant party, Rajiv Gandhi needed allies and support for his nascent reform 
program as well as crucial information.41 Rajiv Gandhi used the various forums 
facilitated by CEI to publicize his reform program. As an illustration, in 1988, he 
spoke at a conference organized in New Delhi by CEI on the need to simplify 
procedures and ensure efficiency in attracting foreign investment.42 CEI’s 
leadership publicized and circulated his ideas to the business community. In 1988 
Tarun Das, CEI’s Director-General, spoke about the ongoing reform program in 
extremely positive terms at several places: ''Rajiv Gandhi is the first Prime 
Minister we've had who understood the private sector. He is trying to take us out 
of our cocoon and expose us to the real world.''43 On the basis of his consultations
with AIEI Rajiv Gandhi transferred responsibility for company affairs from the 
Ministry of Justice to the Industry Ministry. The aim was to remove a major 
bottleneck in approval of industrial licenses, which was a major hazard for 
businessmen in India. Mr. Tarun Das said at that time, “This was a small but 
significant step for domestic and foreign investments and joint ventures.  These 
39I analyze FICCI’s weakness below. 
40In 1976 AIEI started organizing international trade fairs, which allowed their member companies 
to initiate international joint ventures and seek export markets. They also started interacting with 
business associations in other countries and opened international offices: By 1988 they had four 
offices in international cities; by 2001 they had 11 such offices. CII also began co-sponsoring the 
World Economic Forum’s India’s Summit, which became a high profile event in the 1990s.  
41The opposition to Rajiv Gandhi’s reform program has been extensively researched: Kohli 
(1989); Harriss (1987); and Varshney (1999).  
42The Financial Times, 20th April 1988. Also see, “The Indian Government is Set for a More 
Relaxed Approach Towards Foreign Investment,” The Economic Times, 22 April 1988. 
43“India’s Tentative Turnaround,” The New York Times, 29 May 1988.  
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would now be approved six months to two years earlier.”44 Thus, Rajiv Gandhi 
used the organization as a platform to launch his reform program and to gain 
support from India’s business community. At that time public sector engineering 
firms dominated AIEI and CEI; by encouraging this organization, he was able to 
spread his ideas to a sector which was expected to resist some of the changes 
planned by him. 
Over time, other state actors have continued to use business associations to 
initiate and publicize difficult policy change. In the early 1990s, Manmohan 
Singh, the then Finance Minister and part of a minority government, was faced 
with a similar opposition to his reform program in parliament, where he depended 
upon crucial support from opposition parties. He recommended that CII 
popularize his ideas of economic reform to the opposition parties in parliament. 
CII started organizing forums for parliamentary parties in the early 1990s and has 
continued that practice ever since.45 Again, in December 2001, prime minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee asked CII to invite Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s former prime 
minister to India when it was politically difficult for Vajpayee to take ownership 
for that invitation.46 Again, after India’s nuclear tests (in May 1998), Vajpayee 
requested CII to use their US connections to change US public opinion in favor of 
India.47  In 2003-2004, CII set up a WTO cell in Geneva; Arun Shourie, the then 
Minister of Disinvestment and Commerce, suggested that CII monitor the WTO 
process more closely.48 In 2004, P. Chidambaram, India’s Finance Minister, asked 
the business chambers to convince the left parties in the coalition government to 
support an increase in the Foreign Direct Investment cap in the insurance sector. 
He said: ''I would like CII and FICCI to address some of our friends in the Left 
parties and convince them (that the move is progressive).”49
AIEI’s meteoric rise to power in the 1980s and 1990s can be directly 
traced to the access and importance facilitated by Rajiv Gandhi. In 1985, Rajiv 
Gandhi agreed to address the AIEI annual meeting although he had refused a 
similar invitation from FICCI.50 He encouraged CEI to submit concept, ‘theme,’ 
and policy papers to the government, which began to introduce business oriented 
perspectives in the government and also support his reform program.51 Rajiv 
44“India to Go Ahead with Election,” The Financial Times, 10 November 1984.  
45 Interview with CII officials.  
46Confidential Interview, Washington DC July 2005. In December 2001, she visited India on a 
“private visit” on the invitation of CII soon after the august summit between Pakistan’s president 
Musharraf and India’s prime minister Vajpayee. 
47Confidential Interview with author, Washington DC, July 2005.  
48Interview of a senior CII official with author, New Delhi July 17 2003. Interestingly, in the late 
1990s, CII had rejected a similar recommendation by a prominent journalist.  
49“FDI insurance: UPA Hopes BJP Will Return Earlier Favour, Indian Express, 13 July, 2004. 
50Kochanek (1995-1996).   
51Interview with senior CII officials. One government official told me: “We needed different 
views to stir things up a little; otherwise, Rajiv Gandhi’s program would have gone nowhere. We 
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Gandhi even played a role in the transformation of the organization from an 
engineering association to an all-industry association.  Rajiv Gandhi suggested 
that CEI represent all industry and move beyond its engineering focus. He is 
reported to have told the Secretary-general, Tarun Das: “You are doing good 
work. I like the work you are doing.  Why don’t you transform into a general 
industry association?”52 The secretariat took this proposal to its members and 
faced some opposition to this change from within.  This led them to hire a 
consultant to evaluate whether such a change was desirable.53 The consultant 
recommended that the CEI retain its focus as an organization servicing the 
engineering industry; he argued that the transformation would be deleterious for 
their engineering members leading the association to lose focus. After many 
deliberations and discussions within the association, a decision was taken to 
override the decision of the consultant and make the organization represent the 
whole of Indian industry. Rajiv Gandhi’s sponsorship and the access and power 
such a linkage would provide was a major reason for overriding the 
recommendation of the consultant.54 Thus, the prime minister played a major role 
in transforming an engineering association into an all-purpose industry 
association.
His close relationship with the members of the body allowed the 
association to acquire political access and influence, which were then denied to 
other bodies.  Rajiv Gandhi added credibility to the AIEI when he invited AIEI 
leaders to accompany him on a trip to the Soviet Union (Kochanek 1995-96). This 
was the first time that a business delegation accompanied India’s prime minister 
on an official foreign trip; Rajiv Gandhi facilitated this inclusion despite serious 
opposition from within the bureaucracy. On hearing of AIEI’s inclusion in the 
PM’s entourage, the Indian Ambassador to the USSR (1983-1986), Nurul Hasan 
is reported to have telegraphed back his displeasure.55 He told the government: 
“The private sector businessmen cannot be part of a state delegation.” Rajiv 
Gandhi, on hearing this, told the foreign ministry officials to “throw the telegraph 
in the dustbin” and proceeded to take the AIE members with him.56 This action 
needed to break down shibboleths and narrow assumptions about government’s role, the public 
sector and the like. Input from a different business organization was necessary to this task. So, he 
encouraged them and invited them to submit recommendations and concept papers.” Interview 
with author, New Delhi, July 13, 2003.  
52This information comes from confidential interviews. I crosschecked this information from a 
number of sources and this was confirmed independently in different ways.   
53Prof. S. K. Bhattacharjee of Management Structures and Systems, Mumbai was the consultant 
hired for the job.  
54Interview with CII officials, New Delhi, and San Francisco, June 3, 2005.   
55Nurul Hasan was a powerful member of the CPI, hostile to business and close to the Congress 
Party. He occupied various key posts; in the mid 1980s he was India’s ambassador to the USSR. 
56Interview of a very high level member of CII with the author, 2nd June, Stanford University, 
USA.  
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gave AIEI direct political access, a “selective benefit” of representation in a 
foreign public policy forum and informal power in their future interactions with 
other state functionaries.57 Rajiv Gandhi continued to lend public support to many 
of AIEI’s and CEI’s ideas.58 CII used these early political and bureaucratic 
contacts within the central bureaucracy to build regular—both formal and 
informal—relationships with key elements within the state. Tarun Das recognized 
the pivotal role played by Rajiv Gandhi [1985-1989] in CII’s rise.  He said: “In 
1986, I don’t think CEI was seen as one of the front-ranking organizations. But 
between 1986 and 1991 this has been achieved.”59 Recently, he said: “That period 
[Rajiv Gandhi’s prime minister-ship] was a crucial period for us [CII].”60 Thus, 
the transformation of CII as an industry-wide organization owes in no small part 
its existence to the reformist proclivities of the prime minister, who chose to 
patronize the AIEI (and its later incarnation, the CEI) when he needed reformist 
allies. 
Analogously, the expression of state displeasure and withholding of access
has a powerful impact on business associations. After Gujarat riots in February 
2002, CII organized a meeting where some of its own members expressed 
criticism of the Gujarat government’s chief minister. This public criticism created 
a serious rift between CII and the Gujarat government, which even extended to a 
cooling of relations with the BJP-led national government. After this withdrawal 
of state access, Tarun Das personally visited Gujarat’s chief minister, Mr. 
Narendra Modi and apologized to him.61 Despite support from within the 
organization for a more public criticism of social violence in Gujarat, CII has 
decided not to criticize the state government. In 2004, CII even invited Narender 
Modi, Gujarat’s chief minister, to its high profile, India Economic Summit, 
organized with the World Economic Forum, in an effort to patch up its differences 
57This confirms Schneider’s argument that, “State actors are the central protagonists in 
encouraging the formation of voluntary, encompassing associations, sometimes unintentionally, 
and more importantly, intentionally, by offering associations selective benefits such as 
representation in policy forums or authority over public functions or funds (Schneider 2004, 11).”  
58For example, in 1986, AIEI came up with a proposal to build Andaman and Nicobar islands for 
tourism and industry purposes. Rajiv Gandhi supported this proposal at a news conference in 
Dubai.   
59“An Uncanny Ability to Anticipate Events: An Interview with Tarun Das,” Business Standard,
12 January 1992.  
60Interview with author, 2nd June 2005. Publicly, CII credits the 1991 reform program as being 
responsible for its rise and transformation but CII’s rise to power had preceded the 1991 
liberalization program.  
61“A Sorry Sight,” Business Standard, 10 March 2003; “Mr. Modi and CII: the Wages of Crony 
Capitalism,” The Financial Express, 11 March 2003; “After CII, FICCI Reprieve, Promise of Help 
for Modi,” Indian Express 14 March 2003. I confirmed this in confidential interviews with CII 
officials.    
13Sinha: Understanding the Rise and Transformation of Business Collective Action
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
with the government and BJP.62  Thus, state facilitation of political access and its 
withdrawal has a powerful impact even on institutionally strong associations like 
the CII. The state continues to shape the power, activities, and the discursive 
strategies of business associations in India.
Even more importantly, the nature of state power and its informal 
workings affect the tactics and mechanisms of influence deployed by India’s 
business associations. In India’s parliamentary system, the civil service is 
permanent and powerful. This led the leadership of CII to interact with the civil 
service through many diverse channels. Tarun Das revealingly said in an early 
interview: “We have consistently had a policy of working with the civil service 
that is there at the centre and the States. We find that they are the administration, 
they are the prominent people there. And, therefore, we feel that while we must 
address the political level. . . and we do that but on a continuous basis, there is a 
continuous dialogue and interaction with the bureaucracy at all levels.”63 Second, 
CII had to adapt to the informal ways in which the business–politics relationship 
has evolved in India. Tarun Das himself emphasized this in an interview outlining 
the process of re-working the FERA [The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act] in 
1991-1992. “The FERA is being revised and re-drafted. And, we found out who 
are the two or three officers behind the scene. We have a core group on FERA. 
We arranged an informal briefing between the core group and the people in the 
government working on the re-drafting of the FERA. Our meetings are –informal, 
off-the record, not for publicity at all. We are very conscious of the fact that when 
we have informal discussions with the government, we don’t go for media 
coverage on that. And, we try to build up this relationship of mutual trust very 
very carefully and we try to earn that trust through our actions.”64 Responding to a 
question about the strengths of CII, Tarun Das, further noted: “We spend a lot of 
time interacting informally with the government. Apart from representations, we 
give a lot of time to informal discussions.”65 A close observer of CII’s success 
said: “CII and Tarun Das understand the nature of Indian system perfectly. He is 
the chairman of a company and knows the nitty gritty of India’s business 
environment. He has his pulse on its very specific and informal workings.  He 
knows how it works and how to get around it.”66 Third, given India’s strong state 
traditions, business associations present themselves in subsidiary roles rather than 
independent interlocutors to the government; the discursive rhetoric of 
62“Mobbed, Modi Shows ‘Civilized’ Face,” The Telegraph, 22 December 2004. The report noted 
that the protestors at the summit urged Rahul Bajaj, the person who had expressed his criticisms in 
2002, to join the protests but he declined.  Also see, “Modi Runs into Protests at WEF,” November 
24, 2003, http://in.rediff.com/news/2003/nov/24modi.htm 
63“An Uncanny ability to Anticipate Events: Interview with Tarun Das,” Business Standard, 12 
January 1992.  
64Ibid. Emphasis Added.  
65Ibid. Emphasis Added.  
66Interview with Author, December 15, 2004, Washington DC. The interviewee stressed this point.   
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associations even in the globalization era is shaped by the dominant nature of 
state power in India. Thus, CII has described the association’s relationship to the 
government as “the junior partner of the government.”67 Its officially stated 
principles are: “partnership with government” and a “consensus approach.”68 One 
of the reasons of the success of CII is its ability not to be seen criticizing the 
government in international or even domestic forums. CII claims to have a 
supportive and collaborative approach rather than a confrontational approach to 
its working with the Indian government.69 As one CII official put it: “We do a lot, 
I mean, a lot, of quiet lobbying and even criticizing the government but we never 
publicize it.70 Thus, CII’s emergence and success in breaking into a pluralistic 
interest group arena dominated by many organizations owes itself to crucial 
sponsorship by the prime minister, and his reformist allies. This opening up of the 
political opportunity structure in the mid 1980s led to the rise and transformation 
of AIEI into CEI and then CII. Reciprocally, Rajiv Gandhi’s reform program 
represented an opening in the political opportunity structure of the Indian state for 
the smaller, external association and CII was able to convert its outside status and 
informal connections to its advantage only because it adapted to the nature of 
state power in India’s political economy.   
The Impact of India’s Federal State on Business Associations in India
In addition, the institutional form of the Indian state, for example, its 
federal structure, affects the organizational form, tactics, and activities of CII as 
well as other associations.71 The federal “opportunity structure” of the Indian state 
67Tarun Das characterized it thus: “We look at it this way: development is a partnership process 
between government and industry. And we are the junior partner of the government.” “Interview 
with Tarun Das: An Uncanny Ability to Anticipate Events,” Business Standard, 12 January 1992. 
68“CII, A Profile,” Found in Directory of CII members, 2003, Available with author.  
69This was stressed in all my interviews with CII officials. This point is also noted by Kochanek 
(1995-1996). 
70Interview with a high level official of the CII, August 2003. New Delhi. The one exception was 
the debate over Gujarat riots. In 2001, the CII organized a forum in which criticism of the Gujarat 
government response to the riots in Gujarat was expressed. This created a huge public relations 
quagmire for CII as the Gujarat CM showed its anger against the CII and many BJP government 
officials expressed their displeasure at CII’s sponsorship of the event.   
71A similar impact of federalism on the organizational structure of business associations may be 
found in other federal countries. In Brazil the major industry confederation, CNI, was composed 
of 27 state level federations, each with one vote similar to the equal representation of its provincial 
units in its national senate (see Schneider 2004, 94).  Similarly, in Germany, the BDI is the 
umbrella organization of German industry and industry-related service providers and has 15 
regional offices in the German Länders (provinces) [http://www.bdi-online.de/]. In the United 
States, the NAM (National Association of Manufacturers) and the US Chamber of Commerce all 
have offices in the 50 states (The US Chamber of Commerce has 2,800 state and local chambers). 
See, http://www.nam.org and http://www.uschamber.com.  
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is mirrored in the multi-level structure adopted by CII. CII’s organization consists 
of regional offices, state offices and a national office similar to India’s political 
structure.72 Interestingly, CII’s predecessor, AIEI, was first noticed by Rajiv 
Gandhi at an AIEI organized event with the Uttar Pradesh government in 1983; 
this led to a long-standing relationship between the two.73 CII’s offices organize 
events and activities for the local state governments and seek favors and 
interactions with them. CII’s activities and structure especially respond to 
resurgent provincial demands for economic reform in India’s “federal market 
economy.”74 In 1995, CII organized its centennial “Partnership Summit” in 
Calcutta (West Bengal), publicizing the West Bengal government’s liberalization 
policy to the outside world. It, in concert with the state government, signaled that 
a radical change in West Bengal reflected a credible and permanent change in its 
policy orientation in favor of liberalization. Ever since then, it has held numerous 
partnership summits (an annual event); the last two (2003 and 2004) have been in 
association with Chandrababu Naidu, the then chief Minister of the state of 
Andhra Pradesh and the latest one was held in association with West Bengal 
(2005). CII has provided national and even international forums for state chief 
ministers to publicize their state’s industrial policies to the domestic and 
international arenas; in the process, enhancing CII’s prestige and embedding the 
density of interactions between the local leadership and the global arena.75 Thus, 
in a federal country, CII has played a major role in disseminating support for 
liberalization across India’s states and in ensuring that opposition to the reform 
does not coalesce into a full-scale movement against the reform process.76
Interestingly, this also created duplication and the coordination dilemmas with 
each CII provincial office organizing similar events simultaneously.77
With an increasing role played by regional states in the ongoing 
liberalization process, FICCI has also found itself initiating parallel activities at 
the subnational level.78 In 1996 FICCI set up zonal offices, which were further re-
72The organizational structure of CII can be found at www.ciionline.org 
73Interview with CII official, 2nd June 2005, San Francisco.  
74Rudolph and Rudolph (2001).  
75This is true of Bihar, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh.  
76For a fine-grained understanding the process by which economic reforms have become 
sustainable in India, see Jenkins (1999).  
77Interview with CII officials, Washington DC May 2005; New Delhi, 27 August 2003; and 
Bombay, May 2003.  
78FICCI, a federation of regional and sectoral chambers, is at heart a federal organization but its 
loose relationship with the much more independent regional chambers meant that coordination 
across levels (between the regional chamber and the national FICCI office) remained infrequent. 
Each of the regional chambers and their own name, constitution, administration, and finances and 
were only loosely associated with FICCI. Thus, state level activities of the FICCI were conducted 
under the aegis of the regional chambers rather than under a unified banner of FICCI. 
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organized in 2003.79 In 2003, FICCI decided to set up three regional and eight 
state-level offices to “deepen its state level activities.”80 This was partly in 
response to the increasing role played by states in shaping liberalization81 and 
partly in response to the fact that CII had regional and state offices and quite 
significant state-level activities. As Dilip Salvekar, the Joint Secretary-General of 
the Maharashtra Chamber of Commerce and Industry said: “Being the financial 
capital, we needed an organization like FICCI which is involved in national and 
international issues. It is most appropriate that FICCI should come to Mumbai 
since other national level chambers like Assocham and CII are already here.”82
The power of the existing institutions to shape the nature and organizational form 
of business associations speaks to the importance of historical institutionalist 
arguments: institutions in India—both formal in terms of federalism and informal 
norms about state-business interactions—constrain as well as enable associations. 
These two elements—reformist leadership within the state (Rajiv Gandhi’s role), 
and openings provided by the federal structure—encompass the changing 
“political opportunity structure” that gave birth to a new and developmental 
organization in India. To this state-centric analysis we must add another aspect of 
the political opportunity structure: changes in the competitive environment of 
business, that is, the enhanced inter-associational competition in 1980s and 1990s 
India.  
Inter-Business Competition in India
The business competitive environment provided a powerful context for the 
rise of the CII; interestingly, this inter-business competition for political access 
and power continues to shape the form and patterns of collective action in India to 
this date.83 While globalization created a functional need to unify associations, the 
politics of competition prevented such unity and coherence; business associations 
in India continue to be fragmented and to compete intensely.84
First, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the business system entered a 
competitive and transitional phase with internal churning within the existing and 
79“FICCI Setting Up Zonal Offices to Address Regional Issues,” The Pioneer, (New Delhi), 24 
March 1996.  
80Rajeev Jayaswal, “FICCI Setting Up Regional Offices,” The Financial Express, 4 September 
2003.  The state level offices were to be set up in Mumbai, Goa, Ahmedabad, Chennai, Bangalore, 
Kochi, Hyderabad, and Raipur.  
81Jenkins (1999); Saez (2002); and Sinha (2005).  
82Rajeev Jayaswal, “FICCI Setting Up Regional Offices,” The Financial Express, 4 September 
2003. 
83In speaking of competition between associations I focus on competition among organizations for 
political access and to the state; in this paper I do not explore intra-business competition for 
members etc.  
84For an account of how globalization affects collective action see Cerny (1995).  
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predominant business association (FICCI) and the revitalization of another 
business association (Assocham). This provided the initial window of opportunity 
for a new organization to enter the associational marketplace by providing many 
developmental services to both the government and the industry. Second, both the 
existing organizations—FICCI and Assocham—were confronted with a history of 
intra-organizational challenges and weaknesses that made it possible for a 
reformist leader (Rajiv Gandhi) to encourage the transformation of a sectoral 
association and cultivate this association. This competitive encouragement of a 
relative outsider association set into motion the process through which the 
structure of the “business system” changed radically in India. Both these factors 
combined to create the ripe political context for the rise of CII.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the existing apex organization—the 
FICCI—had weakened. FICCI had been subject to internal infighting and conflict 
for almost a decade, but in the mid 1980s, the infighting had broken out again and 
in 1987, the association underwent a split when the Bombay group within FICCI 
left the organization (Kochanek 1996-1996; 1996). These Bombay business 
groups joined Assocham, revitalizing the declining organization in the process. 
Thus, the late 1980s and the early 1990s saw a competitive and transitional 
“business system” when internal crisis within one of the premier associations 
(FICCI) revitalized another (Assocham). Simultaneously, the internal 
fragmentation of the existing associations allowed a sectoral association to 
acquire prominence and institutional strength somewhat disproportionate to its 
actual power at that time. 
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw enhanced competition between FICCI 
and Assocham, which recurs periodically. The Bombay business houses—some 
prominent members of the industrial elite in India—had left FICCI after an 
internal fight over bogus membership and the control of decision-making within 
FICCI. They joined Assocham, in the process revitalizing it with resources, talent, 
and new ideas. Assocham saw a significant influx of money and talent into the 
organization.85 Thus, when the CEI thought of catering to the needs of the wider 
industry, it first thought of a merger with Assocham.86 This would have made the 
85See, “Significant Increase in ASSOCHAM Membership,” The Patriot, 9 July 1990; “Big Rise in 
ASSOCHAM Membership,” The Hindustan Times, 9 July 1990; “Sharp Rise in Assocham 
Membership,” Business Standard, 9 July 1990. The annual revenue of Assocham increased from 
25 lakh to 1 crore as a result of the increase in membership. Also, see “Assocham to Enlarge 
Membership,” The Telegraph, 26 November 1990; “Assocham Membership Doubles,” The 
Financial Express, 27 November 1990; “Assocham to Have Enlarged Panel,” Business and 
Political Observer, 27 November, 1990; “Membership of ASSOCHAM Crosses 50,000,” The 
Times of India, 16 May 1991. 
86“CEI May Merge with Assocham, Change Name,” The Economic Times, 15 May, 1991; Subir 
Roy, “CEI, ASSOCHAM Merger Move: Industry Eager to Speak with One Voice,” The Economic 
Times, 16 May 1991; “Merger of Assocham and CEI Welcomed,” The Independent, 18 May 1991; 
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unified body a very powerful organization. Assocham's president at that time 
expressed the desire and need to unite business voices in India. This, he felt, 
would increase the power of business vis-a-vis the government.   He pointed out:
Countries, which have made the most progress in the postwar era like Japan, Germany 
and France, have fundamentally one chamber, which is very powerful and is consulted in 
policymaking. The Japanese PM sometimes even comes to meet the head of Keidanren, 
the apex body of the captains of industry. The German and Paris chambers of commerce 
are almost a part of the respective governments and the status of the British 
Confederation of Industry is well known.87
Simultaneously, the competition between the two main national 
organizations had heated up. FICCI’s sponsorship of the joint business councils, 
involving cooperation and networking with business actors from other countries 
as well as the government officials, was a source of envy for members of other 
associations. Members of CEI felt that their exclusion from these councils, and 
their monopolization by FICCI, was unfair.88 Competition was also evident 
through the movement of members from one organization to another. After 1987, 
Assocham saw the entry of many new members, other chambers, and big 
corporate houses. From 1987 to 1991, the direct membership doubled to 500 and 
the indirect membership increase eightfold to 52,000. In 1991, nine more big 
companies became the “patron members” of the association.89 These included a 
wide array of industrial companies that gave added prestige and reputation to the 
organization. After this induction, Assocham enjoyed the patronage of such 
companies as Tata Sons, Bajaj Auto, Mahindra and Mahindra, Chowgulke and 
Co, Hindustan Lever, ITC, Philips Carbon Black, (RPG), Shaw Wallace and 
Company, Premier Automobiles, The Mafatlal Spinning and Company, The 
MRF, Modi Xerox, DLF Universal, Indian Aluminum, and the Amalgamation Ltd 
(Simpson group). Many of these companies had left the FICCI and joined 
Assocham, thus putting a competitive pressure on FICCI.90 It could be argued that 
CEI through this transformation wanted to replace FICCI as the single most 
powerful industry association in the country.91 Increased competition between 
“CEI Changing Name to take on FICCI, Assocham,” Business and Political Observer, 7
November 1991.  
87Subir Roy, “CEI, ASSOCHAM merger move: Industry eager to Speak with One Voice,” The 
Times of India, 16 May 1991. 
88Interview with CII official, New Delhi, 23 August 2003. 
89“Nine more Companies Join ASSOCHAM,” The Statesman, 18 February 1991; “9 Big 
Companies Join Assocham,” The Hindustan Times, 18 February 1991. 
90See, “More Companies Join ASSOCHAM,” 18 February, 1991 Times of India; “New Assocham 
Patron Members,” The Independent, 18 February 1991; “ASSOCHAM Gains 9 More Members,” 
Indian Express, 18 February 1991.  
91A. Thothathru Raman, “CEI Changing Name to Take on FICCI, Assocham,” Business and 
Political Observer, 7 November 1991. Also see, Indranil Ghosh, “Renaming CEI Raises Many an 
Eyebrow,” The Financial Express, 4 January 1992; S. Roy, “Muscling into the Top,” Business 
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FICCI and Assocham provided a rare opening for organizations like CEI to think 
about entering the competitive fray, and they did. 
Competition and Developmental Transformation
The specific business-politics relationship in late 1980s and early 1990s 
India shaped the nature of the new organization that took shape. Historical 
conjuncture mattered. Up to that point, India’s regulatory system and the 
business-politics relationship were analogous to a political exchange: in exchange 
for specific favors, business actors supported governments and politicians. The 
government’s role was overly regulative and the business associations sought only 
particularistic benefits for their firms or sectors abandoning any governance or 
developmental activities. Thus, India came to be invoked as a classic “rent-
seeking society”92 and its business-state pattern characterized by “embedded 
particuralism.”93 This larger pattern contributed to the organizational malaise in 
which FICCI found itself. By the late 1980s the weakness of existing associations, 
specifically their inability to provide any value-added to their members and to 
facilitate long-term development of the economy, had become apparent. Most 
business associations in India served the interest of few powerful business groups 
rather than their larger membership base or needs of a reforming government. 
AIEI/CEI, excluded from this system, sought to distinguish themselves by 
providing key developmental services to their members and sought international 
access. With the opening in the system and Rajiv Gandhi’s ascent to power, CEI 
articulated a new ‘business model’ of associations, which would provide services 
to the government as well as its members. Given the political factionalism of the 
existing associations, CEI organized a strong secretariat-led organization, which 
would keep above the fray of infighting among business houses. In doing so, they 
offered a distinct organizational and service model to the government and existing 
associations (FICCI and Assocham), which were hounded by infighting and 
political interference by powerful business houses within their organizations. 
Most crucially, this resonated with Rajiv Gandhi’s reformist agenda, but also 
filled a major gap in India’s associational marketplace for developmental 
associations. Simultaneously, Rajiv Gandhi sought reform-oriented policy and
concept papers from CEI and encouraged them continue with their innovative 
services. Subsequently, state officials—both central and provincial—continued to 
seek their services and demand more developmental activities. Most importantly, 
CEI’s membership base consisted of engineering firms, run mostly on 
professional lines that were engaged in extensive joint ventures and foreign 
Standard, 12 January 1992; and “Chambers Vie with Each Other for Supremacy,” Indian Express,
28 May 1992.  
92Kruger (1974). 
93Herring (1999).  
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collaborations. They demanded quality-oriented services from their secretariat 
and access to foreign markets. Once CII began providing such services, and with 
liberalization of the Indian economy, such services came to be more in demand. 
Thus, business competition in India took a developmental shape because it filled a 
crucial weakness in the then existing system, resonated with the reformist agenda 
of the then prime minister, and corresponded with the ongoing liberalization of 
the economy, where both markets and states needed information, governance 
input, and key services for the onerous transition. This historical form of 
associational transformation continued to shape subsequent changes initiated by 
other associations as greater competition fueled a ‘race to the top’ among business 
associations. 
Impact of Inter-Business Competition 
In response to the business model presented by CII, FICCI sought to 
organize itself and deal with the rise of CII, a powerful competitor. In 1994, the 
newly appointed Secretary-General of FICCI, Dr. Amit Mitra said: “I am glad that 
Tarun Das has worked wonders with the Confederation of Indian industry.  It has 
helped wake FICCI up.”94 Many of the reforms initiated by FICCI—campaign to 
expand membership and subscription, organizational changes, and changing 
purposes to deal with international competition—were in direct response to CII’s 
perceived strengths.95 FICCI decided to go into the business of trade shows and 
exhibitions, a domain in which CII had already carved a name for itself. FICCI 
also started publishing a journal called ‘Quality Trends,’ following in the 
footsteps of CII's quality movement.96 In 1994 in an effort to strengthen its 
secretariat, a five-member core team was set up to oversee radical re-structuring 
of the administrative structures and procedures. FICCI decided to appoint an 
economic expert as a CEO who would also be the secretary-general.  It was at this 
time that Dr. Amit Mitra was chosen to be the Secretary-General.97 Clearly, public 
relations and handling public events was prioritized given the positive publicity 
being received by CII. A new division titled, “Protocol” was set up to handle 
visits of foreign delegations besides looking after the other major functions of the 
chamber. “We want to give better hospitality and have proper management of 
94Arif Sharif, “FICCI’s Mitra Mantra,” The Economic Times, 5 June 1994; Nandini Guha, “He is 
Bent on Making FICCI Fighting Fit,” Financial Express, 16 June 1994. 
95“FICCI Wakes up to New Challenges,” Business Standard, 5 January 1992.  
96“Chambers Vie with Each Other for Supremacy,” Indian Express, 28  May 1992. 
97Interviews; Also see, “FICCI Posed for a Major Restructuring Exercise,” Indian Express, 12 
May 1994; “FICCI Confirms Mitra as Secretary-General,” The Economic Times 11 June 1994; 
“Interview with A.K. Rungta: FICCI to Stress Promotional Work,” The Hindu, 12 June 1994.   
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important events,” said, Mr. A. K. Rungta, a senior Vice President of FICCI.98  In 
1998, a corporatist drive was launched to make FICCI a more efficient 
organization. The leadership of FICCI also began to track news stories on the two 
organizations and do a comparative evaluation of the media coverage of the two 
associations.99 Similar to CII, which seeks to make each of its divisions self-
earning and profit oriented, it was decided that FICCI would run on a profit 
basis.100 In the mid to late 1990s, FICCI launched a new membership initiative 
especially with a view to shake off its “old economy image.” In 2000, around 220 
members from the so-called TMT (technology, media, and telecom) sectors joined 
the association including such companies as Infosys, S. Kumars, Aptec, Sony 
Entertainment Hughes Network systems, and Silverline Tech.  Faced with 
competition FICCI realized that “unless we have a good membership base we will 
lose our voice as an apex industry chamber and also lack financial muscle.”101
Reciprocally, a resurgent FICCI has begun to put competitive pressure on CII: 
Tarun Das recently said: “Yes we are very different from FICCI but their 
presence has kept us on our toes, we have to constantly innovate.”102 Thus, 
competition within the business system shaped the transformation of existing 
organizations (in this case FICCI and Assocham) into developmental associations. 
Yet this competition prevented united collective action on the part of all three 
associations or any moves toward merger or unity. India, despite globalization 
and the transformation into developmental associations, continues to be a ‘state 
dominated pluralist system’ in which numerous groups vie for the state’s attention 
and business is fragmented.  Despite many attempts to unite business action, 
merger moves between CII, FICCI, and Assocham or even joint efforts or 
campaigns between the associations, could not succeed.103
The first such merger was mooted in June-July 1990, but came to 
naught.104 In July 1992, an apex committee constituted by the presidents of the 
three chambers—FICCI, CII, and Assocham—was proposed. It was seen as 
necessary to coordinate among the three chambers given economic liberalization, 
which had changed the role of the chambers from ‘representation’ to that of 
“partners of economic growth.” The main task of the committee was to have joint 
98Ibid.  Also see, “FICCI Stops Buckling under New Initiative in US,” The Economic Times, 18 
May, 1994, “Showdown in FICCI, Secretary-General May be Replaced,” The Economic Times, 11 
May 1994.  
99I thank John Echeverri-Gent for providing me with some information on this issue.  
100“FICCI Acquires New Economy Flavor,” The Times of India, 16 January 2001. 
101Alop Mittal, advisor, FICCI. See, “FICCI Acquires New Economy Flavor,” The Times of India,
16 January 2001.  
102Interview with author, June 2-3, 2005, Stanford University.  
103One exception was during the visit of the then prime minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, to the US in 
May 1994 when all three chambers decided to put up a “united front.” See, “Chambers to Put up 
United Front in US,” Business Standard, 14 May 1994.  
104“FICCI Chief Against Trade Bodies Merger,” The Financial Express, 2 July 1990. 
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meetings with the prime minister, government leaders, and foreign dignitaries.105
This body failed to take shape at that time as leading industrialists in FICCI felt 
that such a body would affect its functioning.106 Again in 1995, another joint body 
was mooted to coordinate strategy vis-à-vis external actors. The initiative to have 
a unified front was first mooted by L.M. Thapar and Mr. S.K. Birla in early 1995 
[members of FICCI]. CII president, Mr. Rajive Kaul, also favored the idea of 
working together both with FICCI and Assocham on issues relating to external 
relations. This effort followed a realization by top industrialists that, “they are 
wasting their time, energy and money in separately hosting visiting foreign 
businessmen under the aegis of Assocham, CII or FICCI when the issues for 
discussion are common. So why not constitute a coordinated body which gives 
equal representation to the three apex chambers.”107 Yet again, this body was 
never instituted and the three chambers today continue to invite foreign 
dignitaries separately.108 In 1993 attempts to form an India International Business 
Council (IIBC) by R.P Goenka, with the support from the foreign ministry of the 
Government of India, and with inclusion of all the three chambers came to 
nothing as it increased infighting rather than any collective or cooperative 
action.109 Again in 2000, there was some effort to present a joint set of 
recommendations on the annual budget but the three chambers could not agree to 
do so. FICCI proposed the joint proposal idea but CII and Assocham preferred to 
go it alone and give their separate suggestions to the Finance Minister.110 Thus, 
competitive politics between the three chambers has continued to be a pervasive 
feature of the interest representation map in India. On one hand, the lack of 
business unity affects the nature of business coherence and the strength with 
which the business community can negotiate with the government. On the other 
hand, this competition stimulates adoption of developmental features by both CII 
and FICCI. 
Institutional Reasons for the Persistence of Fragmentation among Business 
Associations
State leaders also have strong incentives to encourage the ongoing 
fragmentation among the main business bodies. In 2001, the BJP’s leadership 
105“FICCI, ASSOCHAM, CII Plan Joint Panel,” Indian Express, 27 July 1992. 
106“Apex Body of Chambers Hanging Fire,” The Telegraph, 28 September 1992; “FICCI Stymies 
Apex Panel of Chambers,” Business Standard, 28 September 1992. 
107Koteshwar P. Dobhal, “Move to Unite Apex Trade Bodies Gets a New Thrust,” The Observer 
(ND), 22 August 1995. 
108See, “Divided Chambers,” The Business and Political Observer, 20 January 1997.  
109“New Body Leaves Chambers Unhappy,” Times of India, 10 October 1993.  
110“Apex Chambers Divided on Growth Rate Proposals to FM: FICCI for Joint statement, CII and 
ASSOCHAM Want to Go Separately,” Business Standard, 10 October 2000. Also see, “Unholy 
Chamber Wars over JBC: Assocham versus FICCI” M.P Chronicle (Bhopal), 4 August 2000.  
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sought to “discipline” the CII, which it thought had become too powerful. The 
prime minister refused to attend a CII function and began to sponsor and 
encourage its rival, the FICCI.111 This divide and rule strategy continued when 
FICCI was given the opportunity to sponsor a prestigious Indian Diaspora event 
in 2003 and 2004 where the prime minister addressed the delegates. This selective 
access to some business associations further enhanced the competitive fervor 
among the two business associations and the ability of the state to shape the 
political power of business groups. Thus, state actors, at key moments, gave or 
denied access to business associations. 
India’s fragmented cabinet structure (coalition governments in the 1990s) 
and its ongoing regionalization also prevented the consolidation of business 
associations; many associations had access to different types and levels of state 
institutions. In the mid 1980s and early 1990s, CII was linked to the Ministry of 
Finance and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and cultivated its connections 
with the civil service. FICCI had strong links with the Congress Party and other 
ministries such as the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. As regional forces 
became more institutionalized, CII and FICCI accelerated their state-level 
programs and offices; multiple institutional access in India’s “divided leviathan”112
facilitated these business associations but also limited their consolidation and 
development into an encompassing nation-wide association. Simultaneously, as 
India’s political system became more “decentered,”113 business associations 
diversified their strategies to target many different parties (especially regional 
parties) and coalition forces. For example, CII began to interact with numerous 
opposition parties when a minority government of PV Narasimha Rao needed 
support from opposition parties for the survival of its economic reform program 
and coalition partners of the BJP government from 1996 onwards.114 The need to 
access and build interactions with multiple power centers within the Indian state 
prevented the transformation of these business associations into a coherent nation-
wide association; thus the nature of state power—its divided character—shaped 
the continuing fragmentation within the business community.
Conclusion
Conventional scholarship views business associations as functional 
responses to crucial market and state failures or as rent-seeking organizations 
111In 2002 after some criticism of the Gujarat riots at a CII organized meting, Vajpayee refused an 
invitation to address CII’s sponsored World Economic Form meeting, a norm that had been 
followed by many previous PMs. Other ministers— Jashwant Singh (Foreign Minister at that 
time) and Arun Jatiley (Commerce Minister at that time)—also refused to address the meetings.   
112Sinha (2005). 
113Echeverri-Gent (2002).  
114India was run by a minority government in 1991 and coalition governments in 1996, 1998, 
1999, and 2004.  
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seeking private benefits. Both these views are non-political; one views business 
organizations as adequate functional responses, while the other fails to theorize 
the role of the state and political institutions. I propose an alternative framework 
that looks at the interaction between powerful business actors, the pre-existing 
institutional context, and the nature of state power. In my argument, business 
associations are political organizations seeking power and influence. Their 
developmental role in a society is a byproduct of their power-seeking activities. In 
this respect they are similar to other political organizations in society. In seeking 
power, they respond and adapt to the existing distribution of power, the sinews of 
state power and potential of threat from other associations. Thus, in dirigiste 
contexts, nature and distribution of state power and business competition will 
shape the activities, tactics, and strategies adopted by business associations.  
If this is true, then, how may we understand the rise and consolidation of 
power by new business associations, like CII, and the transformation of existing 
business association, like FICCI? Giving analytical importance to the nature of 
state power in a system will tell us that new associations will arise only when 
openings in the national political opportunity structure allow access and new 
opportunities to such emergent organizations. Certain state actors may catalyze 
their emergence and development. These insights are derived from Ben Ross 
Schneider’s argument about the role of specific actions and incentives of state 
actors (rather than macro state or political variables). I combine his stress on the 
role on state actors and their incentives with the idea from the social movement 
literature that changes in political opportunities and constraints within the state 
may provide the openings for business organization or disorganization. When 
such openings exist, reformers within the state may be emboldened to encourage 
the organization of business. Reformist state allies must facilitate the entry of 
outsider organizations and allow them access. Further, and most crucially, the 
entry of new associations and organizations is conditioned not only by the 
opportunities and openings, but also threats and challenges within the dominant 
power hierarchy.115 Thus, the nature and structure of the domestic business 
environment may be a crucial element in the domestic opportunity structure. In 
established democracies, where interest groups have long-standing activities and 
power, openings within the business system—weakness of existing associations, 
and competition with other peak associations (a competitive versus a monopolistic 
business environment)—will shape the rise of new developmental associations. 
Such competition with rival associations may catalyze new and existing 
associations to acquire developmental features. 
This analysis of India presents a few interesting and puzzling features to 
our comparative understanding of business development. The 1990s saw the 
transformation of a weak and fragmented business system into a developmental 
115In a recent re-formulation, McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow (2001, 45-46) emphasize the joint 
impact of opportunities and threats. 
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yet fragmented business system. In contrast to the general presumption that 
competition between associations may weaken both, competition, in fact, 
contributed to the transformation of weaker associations into stronger ones.116
Even more interestingly, despite an enhancement of business power (with 
globalization), the state continues to shape the nature and extent of business 
access to the political system. State actors also facilitate the rise of better 
organizations when this suits their public policy purposes (reform program) and 
aids in power struggles within a conservative state. 
These conclusions emerge from a historically oriented framework that 
pays careful attention to both the macro-political environment and the meso-
institutional business environment faced by capital and collective organizations. 
Employing concepts from the social movement literature as well as historical 
institutional arguments yields a better understanding of the political 
underpinnings of collective action. This framework is more attuned to the political 
and power dynamics that give shape to interest representation in globalizing India 
than its alternatives. Thus, an analysis of developmental collective action in India 
warns us against taking an overly functional account of business associations. 
Associations and organizations not only serve functional needs of its members 
and the state but also seek political power and influence; they, therefore, must be 
understood with the help of political and contextual variables. 
This empirical analysis points toward the theoretical importance of key 
concepts used in this article: the political opportunity structure, and impact of 
historical institutions. Reformist openings within the state represented by Rajiv 
Gandhi (India’s prime minister from 1985-1989) and Manmohan Singh (India’s 
finance minister in the early 1990s) point toward the need to analyze the role of 
specific state actors, and the structure of opportunities and threats presented by 
various political institutions in other contexts. Equally important, the historical 
matrix of institutions in the form of federal structures and the legacy of informal 
and dirigiste state traditions, point to the power of historical institutionlist 
arguments. This analysis of continuity and transformation in business politics 
shows the path-dependent character of institutions, revealing how apparently non-
functional institutions persist.117 Yet pre-existing institutional patterns are not 
merely sources for inefficiency; they also provide pre-conditions for innovation. 
Given the historical pattern of business-state nexus—its rent-seeking and 
particularistic character—competition among associations stimulated the adoption 
of developmental features by many associations as each sought to distinguish 
themselves from the weak organizations of the recent past. 
116This is in contrast to the conventional view that weaker organizations and fragmentation co-
exist. In Argentina and Brazil for example, weakness and fragmentation of business organization 
go together.  
117See Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (1992); Pierson (2004); and Thelen (2004).  
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We therefore need an independent theory of historical genesis and 
transformation of developmental associations. Such a theory must attend 
explicitly to political variables, conceptualized as set of opportunities and threats 
and to changing openings within them; the rise of developmentally oriented 
associations, a somewhat rare occurrence, must struggle against the alignment of 
political forces in the larger system. I identified three important elements of the 
larger political system which play a major role in giving birth to developmental 
associations: the role of the state leadership; the structure of the state (federalism), 
and the competitive configuration of the business system.  The isolation of these 
variables for India has led me to outline the story of the transformation of 
business collective action in India. Threats from competitive organizations and 
the extent of organizational weakness in the business system may facilitate the 
rise and consolidation of developmental-oriented organizations. A competitive 
business system—marked by a large number of associations, movement of 
members among the associations, competitive effort to seek the government’s 
attention—may facilitate the transformation of existing associations into 
developmental ones. Second, the role of the state in facilitating the emergence and 
transformation of developmentally oriented associations may prove to be more 
crucial than prevailing theories or predictions about receding state power predict. 
Despite globalization, states continue to shape the nature and power of business 
collective action.
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